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A Word about Material
(Bakhtin and Tynianov)
ALASTAIR RENFREW
Il y a pour toute chose une théorie qui se
proclame elle-même ‘le bon sens’.
Victor Hugo1
When Mikhail Bakhtin wrote in 1924 of the dangers of a ‘material
aesthetics’,2 his primary concern was not the broadly Marxist approach
with which materialist thought is most commonly associated in the
literary domain; the primary addressee in Bakhtin’s polemic was,
rather, the so-called ‘formal method’, the variegated proponents of
which offered the only significant alternative to ‘Marxism’ in the
struggle for pre-eminence in Soviet literary studies. Bakhtin’s motiva-
tions in attacking the Formalists may have been partly pragmatic,
as Pavel Medvedev’s were to a greater extent in his later extended
statement of the case against Formalism, The Formal Method in Literary
Scholarship, published in 1928 when the outcome of the struggle was less
open to doubt;3 they may also have involved a certain hauteur, with the
SEER, Vol. 84, No. 3, July 2006
Alastair Renfrew is Lecturer in Russian at the University of Exeter.
1 Victor Hugo, Les Misérables, Paris, 1951 [1862], p. 1073.
2 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Problema soderzhaniia, materiala i formy v slovesnom khudozhest-
vennom tvorchestve’, in Raboty 1920–kh godov, Kiev, 1994, pp. 257–318; ‘The Problem of
Content, Material and Form in Verbal Art’, in Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays
by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov; trans. Vadim Liapunov and
Kenneth Brostrom, Austin, TX, 1990, pp. 257–325 (hereafter, Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of
Content, Material and Form’; translations modified, page references from the Russian edi-
tion given first [and throughout]).
The article was partially published as ‘K estetike slova’, in Kontekst–73, Moscow, 1974,
pp. 258–80, and in full in the following year in M. M. Bakhtin, Voprosy literatury i estetiki:
issledovaniia raznykh let, ed. S. Leibovich, Moscow, 1975, pp. 6–71. For a full, if in places
tendentious account of the context and circumstances of the article’s non-publication in
1924, see the commentary in M. M. Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1, ed. S. G. Bocharov
and N. I. Nikolaev, Moscow, 2003, pp. 707–41.
3 P. N. Medvedev, Formal´nyi metod v literaturovedenii. Kriticheskoe vvedenie v sotsiologicheskuiu
poetiku, Leningrad, 1928; P. N. Medvedev/M. M. Bakhtin, The Formal Method in Literary Schol-
arship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, trans. Albert J. Wehrle, Baltimore, MD, 1978.
This translation was reprinted in 1985 with the authors’ names reversed: M. M. Bakhtin/
P. N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological
Poetics, trans. Albert J. Wehrle, Cambridge, MA, 1985 (hereafter, Medvedev, The Formal
Method; all English citations are from the later edition).
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implication that the crudely deterministic approaches that passed for
Marxist scholarship represented, on a theoretical level, an unworthy
opponent. The most important element of Bakhtin’s motivation, how-
ever, is the conviction that Formalism and Marxism, rather than being
the natural enemies their engagement in struggle would seem to imply
— a presumption that has subsequently been entrenched by canonical
literary history — in fact represent two sides of the same coin.4
Two related, fundamental theoretical problems lie at the heart of this
conviction: the first is the venerable dichotomy of form and content,
and the second, which flows from the first, is as stark as it is neglected
— what, indeed, is the material of literature?
I
In the period between the dissolution of Lef and his eventual ‘capitula-
tion’ to the ostensible representatives of Marxism in literary scholar-
ship, Viktor Shklovskii made a last attempt to reunite the scattered
forces of Opoiaz.5 Shklovskii’s objective may have been organizational
security rather than the restoration of a long-lost theoretical unity, but
he was encouraged in his attempts — or at the very least indulged —
by Roman Jakobson and Iurii Tynianov, whose programmatic state-
ment of 1928, ‘Problems in the Study of Literature and Language’, was
4 It should also be noted, however, that Bakhtin has sometimes been seen as operating in
the space between Formalism and Marxism: see for example Ann Shukman, ‘Between Marx-
ism and Formalism: the Stylistics of Mikhail Bakhtin’, in Elinor Shaffer (ed.), Comparative
Criticism: A Yearbook, 2, 1980, pp. 221–34; Michael Bernard-Donals, Mikhail Bakhtin: Between
Phenomenology and Marxism, Cambridge, 1994.
Galin Tihanov, in a broader assessment of the place of Formalism in Western intellec-
tual history, has expressed its curiously ‘doubled’ relationship to Marxism in terms of it
trying to be ‘more Positivist than Positivism’ and attempting to compete with Marxism in
the same (conceptual and pragmatic) arena: Galin Tihanov, ‘Zametki o dispute formalistov
i marksistov 1927 goda’, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 50, 2001, pp. 279–86; see also D. Ustinov,
‘Materialy disputa “Marksizm i formal´nyi metod” 6 marta 1927 g.’, Novoe literaturnoe
obozrenie, 50, 2001, pp. 247–78.
5 Opoiaz [Obshchestvo izucheniia teorii poeticheskogo iazyka] ceased to function as a for-
mal group from the time of Shklovskii’s enforced departure to Berlin early in 1922, although
he, Boris Eikhenbaum and Iurii Tynianov remained associated in personal and professional
terms long after that date. Following his return to Russia late in 1923, Shklovskii sought
institutional succour in the more utilitarian and, perhaps, politically promising context of the
Marxist/Futurist alliance Lef [Levyi front iskusstva], which had absorbed another former
member of Opoiaz, Osip Brik, and could boast at its heart the emblematic figure of Vladimir
Maiakovskii. Lef itself fell apart in the autumn of 1928 due to ideological and personal
tensions, the precise combination of which is difficult to ascertain.
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to be the theoretical and organizational focus of Opoiaz’s restoration.6
Shklovskii must also have been encouraged, however, by something
much more elusive, namely his appreciation of the continuing failure of
avowedly Marxist critics to occupy the centre ground of literary-critical
debate with any degree of theoretical conviction. As Shklovskii writes
to Osip Brik in February 1929:
The most difficult question is the question of our relations with the Marx-
ists. This is in essence a question of an attitude towards an attitude, because
Marxists themselves are not to be found.7
This might even stand as an epitaph for the range of attempts to con-
struct a Marxist theory of literature during the first Soviet decade:
‘Marxists are not to be found’.
Shklovskii’s diagnosis of a virtual absence of convincingly Marxist
approaches to literature is not as surprising as it might first appear,
chiefly because the foundations upon which a Marxist aesthetics were
to be constructed were themselves deeply problematic. There are two
main reasons for this, which are in fact so closely related as to be virtu-
ally inseparable: the first is Marx’s relative reticence on strictly aesthetic
questions (an expression which in itself may have seemed to him a con-
tradiction in terms);8 the second is the concomitant necessity for this
6 Shklovskii invited a number of scholars of varying degrees of proximity to Opoiaz to
respond to the theses set out in Tynianov and Jakobson’s article as the basis for a form of
published manifesto for the new organization; it is ironic, then, that the attempt culminates
in the publication of Shklovskii’s response alone, as the deeply ambivalent and/or compro-
mised ‘Pamiatnik nauchnoi oshibke’, which has been read with some justification as
embodying an unreserved, if tactical, capitulation: V. B. Shklovskii, ‘Pamiatnik nauchnoi
oshibke’, Literaturnaia gazeta, 27 January 1930, p. 4. Also, Iurii Tynianov and Roman
Jakobson, ‘Problemy izucheniia literatury i iazyka’ [1928], in Tynianov, Poetika. Istoriia
literatury. Kino, Moscow, 1977 (hereafter, Poetika), pp. 282–83; ‘Problems in the Study of
Literature and Language’, in Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (eds), Readings in
Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views, Ann Arbor, MI, 1978 [1971], pp. 79–81.
For a recent detailed account of Shklovskii’s endeavours in this respect, see Aleksandr
Galushkin, ‘“I tak, stavshi na kostiakh, budem trubit´ sbor”: K istorii ne sostoiavshegosia
vozrozhdeniia Opoiaza v 1928–1930 gg.’, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 44, 2000, pp. 136–58.
7 Ibid., p. 142. Shklovskii goes on in the same letter to relate Lev Iakubinskii’s insistence on
the need for a Marxist linguistics, despite the latter’s uncertainty as to what precisely that
would entail. Linguistics offers an instructive parallel for literary studies in this respect, and
I am indebted to Nikolai Nikolaev for pointing out an aspect of the particular ‘logic’ of
Shklovskii’s objective: if Marxism was able to establish itself as the authorized ‘Marxist’ lin-
guistic doctrine, why not a brand of modified (i.e. historicized or ‘sociologized’) Formalism
as the ‘one method’ for literary criticism?
8 This difficulty is further compounded by the publication history of certain of Marx’s
works in Russian translation: The German Ideology, for example, was first published in 1932,
long after the point when it may have affected on-going debate in theory and criticism. For
an extended excerpt, see Karl Marx, Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, Oxford, 1977,
pp. 159–91. With the benefit of long hindsight, the section on ‘The First Premises of the
Materialist Method’ from The German Ideology seems almost predictive of Voloshinov’s cri-
tique of Plekhanov’s idea of ‘social psychology’ and, in particular, of his definition of the
materiality of the sign, for which Marx’s assertion that ‘from the start the “spirit” is afflicted
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deficiency to be supplemented by followers and interpreters of Marx in
the Russian and Soviet context, often, and most damagingly, with
direct reference to those core principles of Marxism which were only
secondarily, and even tangentially, concerned with aesthetics.9 Thus, to
take an obvious example, the laws of supply and demand might be
invoked in assessment of the production and circulation of literary
‘goods’, an approach which found expression in the work of Boris
Arvatov,10 and rather more sophisticated treatment at different points
in Trotskii’s Literature and Revolution. Trotskii attempts to relate aesthetic
investigation to the canon of Marxist theory and, at the same time, to
anticipate and obviate the unacceptably crude and self-defeating
attempts of others to do something similar:
That the demand for art is not created by economic conditions is inargu-
able. But neither is the demand for food and warmth created by economics.
On the contrary, economics is created by the demand for food and
warmth. [. . .] Works of art must in the first place be judged by their own
laws, i.e. by the laws of art. But only Marxism is capable of explaining why
and from where a given direction in art has arisen in any given epoch, i.e.
who has demanded certain artistic forms and not others, and why.11
The supplementation of Marxist aesthetics by reference to non-
aesthetic strictures was not, however, restricted to the question of sup-
ply and demand, which might be regarded as a surface manifestation of
a more fundamental problem: the relationship of the (economic) ‘base’
to the (ideological) ‘superstructure’.
The difficulties implied by this foundation stone of dialectical mate-
rialism can be summarized in a single word which has haunted Marxist
and materialist approaches to art in and beyond the Soviet context:
8 Continued
with the curse of being “burdened” with matter, which here makes its appearance in the
form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language’ is a paradoxical ‘forebear’
(Marx, Selected Writings, p. 167). See V. N. Voloshinov, Marksizm i filosofiia iazyka, in
Voloshinov, Filosofiia i sotsiologiia gumanitarnykh nauk, St Petersburg, 1995, pp. 216–380
(pp. 221–28); Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik,
Cambridge, MA, and London, 1986, pp. 9–15 (hereafter, Voloshinov, Marxism and the
Philosophy of Language).
9 Chief among these is Plekhanov, who in effect furnished the aesthetic backdrop of
‘orthodox’ Marxism in the Soviet 1920s, and was particularly influential in his idea of ‘social
psychology’ as a mediator between base and superstructure; see G. V. Plekhanov, Literatura
i estetika, Moscow, 1958. Lev Trotskii’s Literatura i revoliutsiia, Moscow, 1991 [1923] (Literature
and Revolution, London, 1991) was an important polemical continuation of the aesthetic
supplementation of Marx; a less frequently acknowledged refinement of both Plekhanov and
Trotskii is Nikolai Bukharin’s ‘O formal´nom metode v iskusstve’, Krasnaia nov´, 3, 1925, pp.
248–57, a stenogram recording of his contribution to the dispute ‘Iskusstvo i revoliutsiia’,
which took place on 13 March 1925.
10 B. Arvatov, ‘Literatura i byt’, Zvezda, 6, 1925, pp. 308–19; B. Arvatov, ‘Utilitarizm v
literature’, Oktiabr´, 12, 1925, pp. 100–06.
11 Trotskii, Literature and Revolution, pp. 141–42; p. 207.
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determinism. If the range of human activities that combine to form
‘culture’ are phenomena of the superstructure which develops from
the economic base, the question arises as to the precise nature of the
relationship between culture, or any element of it, and the economic
relations that underpin it. The response that the characteristics of the
base determine the nature of superstructural elements leads all too easily
to an assumption of direct, mechanistic causality: to use the example
given by Valentin Voloshinov as something of a ‘straw man’ in his
argument against the tenability of such mechanistically causal interpre-
tations of base-superstucture relations, the appearance of the lishnii
chelovek in mid-nineteenth-century Russian fiction might be directly and
causally related to a crisis in the autocracy and in the quasi-feudal
economy of the immediately preceding period.12 Voloshinov’s response
is to argue that
the establishment of a connection between the base and an isolated
phenomenon, torn from its integral and unified ideological context, is of no
cognitive value whatsoever.13
Voloshinov in fact follows very closely the argument of Bukharin,
although, as we shall see, with a very different purpose:
You can isolate any phenomenon of social life, any fragment or series, but
[. . .] if you do not see its function in life, if you do not regard it as an
organic component of a social whole, [. . .] you will never understand these
phenomena.14
Bukharin essentially argues that the base-superstructure model requires
a high degree of sophistication in its application to ideological and
cultural phenomena, which will consist, more or less, in a refusal to
perform the kind of specific isolation Voloshinov later mocks: early-
nineteenth-century political and economic crisis causally determines the
appearance of the lishnii chelovek. Yet, just as conclusively as the crudest
of determinists, to whom (along with the arch anti-determinists of early
Formalism) his strictures are addressed, Bukharin, as he must, leaves
intact the base-superstructure paradigm, which is the basis for a
dichotomy that has proved problematic, and often insurmountable, for
most critical methodologies: form versus content.
A theory of causality, whether mechanical or not, is inclined to be
resistant to consideration of form, inasmuch as form is immaterial to
ideology: why would it matter, to continue with our example, whether
the lishnii chelovek should be manifest chiefly in fiction, or in verse, or in
12 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 230; p. 18.
13 Ibid., p. 229; pp. 17–18.
14 Bukharin, ‘O formal´nom metode v iskusstve’, p. 255.
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both? Similar economic and social stimuli to those that ‘produced’ the
lishnii chelovek might have found their expression, on a thematic level, in
whatever literary forms were currently dominant; formal means are
receptive to the ideological effects produced by changes in basal eco-
nomic relations, but they are powerless to ‘determine’ them. And even
when Marxism turns to questions of form, there is a tendency to treat
it exactly like content: the question of which particular forms are
‘demanded’, pace Trotskii, by the dominant class is related to the basal
factors that have determined the dominance of that class, or are in the
process of shifting class relations. Form either obeys content, i.e. they
stand in a particular, hierarchical relationship; or, somewhat bizarrely,
form is the ‘same’ as content, which implies an even greater deforma-
tion of their relationship. The possibility of an integral, mutually consti-
tutive relationship is obviated from the very outset by adherence, in
whatever degree, to the base-superstructure model.
From the other side, the stimulus for the arguments of Trotskii,
Bukharin and, in a different way, Voloshinov, is the aggressive, polemi-
cally-charged commitment to form over content which, alongside the
idea of the distinctiveness of a specifically ‘poetic’ language, was the
self-defining hallmark of early Formalism. This iconoclastic brand of
Formalism, replete with the pathos of Futurism, found its most robust
expression in works by Shklovskii such as ‘Kak sdelan “Don Kikhot”’
and Khod konia, the latter of which is the specific object of Trotskii’s
disdain in Literature and Revolution.15 As Medvevev will later argue,
Shklovskii’s rejection of the dialectics of the base-superstructure model
implies not only that form predominates over content, but does so to
such an extent that content, and hence meaning, is finally expelled, if not
quite from the literary work itself, then at least from the process of its
study. This expulsion of content consists in two related operations: first,
the ‘material’ of the literary work is associated with fabula, the range of
ethical, political, historical and ‘real-life’ events and phenomena which
in various ways precede it; these are artistically organized to form its
siuzhet, sometimes referred to as ‘plot’, but better understood as the
immanent, literary organization of the events and phenomena which
constitute fabula, transformed in a range of processes that would
become the technical focus of Formalist theory. The literary work,
in this analysis, is literally ‘made out of ’ disparate elements of its
pre-literary environment, conceived in the widest possible sense, and it
15 V. B. Shklovskii, ‘Kak sdelan “Don Kikhot”’ [1921], in Shklovskii, O teorii prozy, Moscow,
1929, pp. 91–124; ‘The Making of Don Quixote’, in Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, trans. Benjamin
Sher, Elmwood Park, 1990, pp. 72–100. Viktor Shklovskii, Khod konia, Orange, CT, and
Dusseldorf, 1986 [1923].
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is the job of literary study to determine precisely how this process takes
place.16
Secondly, the hierarchical relationship attributed to literary artifice
and ‘real’ material in early Soviet Marxist scholarship is reversed:17 the
literary work is no longer the ‘vessel’ of ideologically significant mate-
rial, but rather that material serves, in a celebrated formulation, ‘only
as motivation of the narrative devices’.18 Thus the ‘content’ of the
literary work is not directly significant in itself, but rather for the way in
which it enables various transformative techniques, specifically, various
compositional devices (‘braking’ [tormozhenie], ‘making difficult’
[zatrudnenie], ‘repetition’ [povtorenie], etc., all of which are related to the
‘master’ device of ‘alienation’ or ‘making strange’ [ostranenie]). Hence
Shklovskii’s hyperbolic contention that Don Quixote’s travels are sig-
nificant only in so far as they motivate the device of ‘stringing together’
[nanizyvanie], in so far, that is, as they provide the ‘raw materials’ for the
construction of a uniquely literary ‘reality’.19 Shklovskii’s aim is clearly
to undermine an idea of ‘faithful’ realistic representation and, by
extension, deterministic conceptions of the relationship between art
and life (or, as we have seen, base and superstructure). Yet even though
this characteristically extreme step might be regarded as rhetorically
overdetermined, as opposed to theoretically ‘sincere’, it vividly illus-
trates the ostensible gulf between the Formalists and the Marxists at this
early stage, and its theoretically disastrous implications for the problem
of form and content.
A methodological alternative did emerge in the mid-1920s, which
promised to ameliorate the worst effects of (Marxist) determinism and
(Formalist) abstraction. This took the form of a ‘staggered’ critical
methodology, which would perform an immanent textual analysis
of the literary work before proceeding to examination of its relations
with the surrounding ‘extra-artistic social environment’ (‘vnekhudoz-
hestvennaia sotsial´naia sreda’). Voloshinov attributes this approach
16 Tynianov manages to provide an admirably clear statement of this principle in an
article devoted to the problem of siuzhet and fabula in cinema as much as in the literary text,
but without becoming diverted by the specificity of material in film, which is deserving of
closer examination in its own right: Iu. N. Tynianov, ‘O siuzhete i fabule v kino’ [1926], in
Tynianov, Poetika. Istoriia literatury. Kino, pp. 324–25.
See also Iu. N. Tynianov, ‘Ob osnovakh kino’ [1927], in ibid., pp. 326–45; Yury
Tynyanov, ‘The Fundamentals of Cinema’, Russian Poetics in Translation, 9, 1982 (The Poetics of
Cinema), pp. 32–54.
17 It should be noted that Soviet Marxist scholarship did not of course invent what was and
is the most enduring principle of non-academic understanding of the functioning of
literature.
18 Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 146; p. 107.
19 It is in ‘Kak sdelan “Don Kikhot”’, incidentally, that Shklovskii utters what will later
provoke direct refutation in Bakhtin: ‘the word is a thing’ (‘slovo — veshch´’); see note 35
below.
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in its mature form to Pavel Sakulin, although there are a number of
earlier examples of a similar methodological orientation, including
Aleksandr Tseitlin and, once again, Trotskii’s Literature and Revolution.20
Tseitlin begins by acknowledging what has earlier been admitted by
Plekhanov, and will later be repeated by Shklovskii in his letter to Brik,
namely that ‘a Marxist [. . .] aesthetics still does not exist’.21 He then
attempts to bring together the methodologies of Formalism and
‘sociologism’, but in a very particular hierarchical relation: a ‘purely
formal analysis’ of the literary work, which will initially involve the
description and classification of the ‘facts’, is not only ‘primary and
essential’, but is in fact the ‘fundament, without which any [subse-
quent] sociological synthesis is inconceivable’.22 Trotskii advances a
very similar proposition, but with a markedly different valorization of
each successive methodological ‘phase’: the work of art may, as we
have seen, be judged in the first instance ‘according to its own laws’,
but this aspect of literary methodology must accept its essentially sub-
sidiary (sluzhebnaia) role, its preparatory status in relation to the core
‘scientific’ business of establishing the work’s social and ideological sig-
nificance. For Trotskii, formal analysis of the literary work performs the
same function as statistics in the social sciences, and the microscope for
biology.23
There are two obvious difficulties with this all-too-convenient joining
of diverse critical methodologies: as the distinct valorizations of each
phase in the process offered by Tseitlin and Trotskii strongly imply,
and as Robert Maguire has pointed out, critical practice would always
tend to emphasize one side or the other; sociological analysis seeking
to relate itself more convincingly to the text through essentially supple-
mentary formal means, or formal analysis seeking to ‘justify’ itself
20 V. N. Voloshinov, ‘Slovo v zhizni i slovo v poezii’ [1926], in Filosofiia i sotsiologiia
gumanitarnykh nauk, pp. 59–86 (p. 59); ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry’, Russian
Poetics in Translation, 10, 1983 (Bakhtin School Papers), pp. 5–30 (p. 5) (hereafter, Voloshinov,
‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry’).
P. N. Sakulin, Sotsiologicheskii metod v literaturovedenii, Moscow, 1925. See also P. N.
Medvedev, ‘Sotsiologizm bez sotsiologii: o metodologicheskikh rabotakh P. N. Sakhulina’,
Zvezda, 2, 1926, pp. 267–71; ‘Sociologism Without Sociology: On the Methodological Works
of P. N. Sakulin’, Russian Poetics in Translation, 10, 1983 (Bakhtin School Papers), pp. 67–74.
Sakulin is also worthy of Maiakovskii’s impatient attentions in his 1923 poem ‘Rabochim
Kurska’: ‘V vash / stoletnii iubilei / ne prol´iut / Sakuliny / rechei elei’, Vladimir
Maiakovskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v trinadtsati tomakh, Moscow, 1955–61, vol. 5, pp. 149–65
(p. 164).
A. Tseitlin, ‘Marksisty i formal´nyi metod’, Lef, 3, 1923, pp. 114–31.
21 Ibid., p. 115.
22 Ibid., pp. 121–22.
23 Trotskii, Literature and Revolution, p. 131; p. 193.
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by working outwards from the text to the social context. More funda-
mentally, however, both versions of this superficially integrated or
‘staggered’ method end by reaffirming precisely what they have set out
to resolve or overcome: the fatal division between form and content.
II
The factor that determines this counter-intuitive similarity, and which
is the basis of our characterization of Marxism and Formalism as the
two sides of the same — material aesthetic — coin, is their shared
conception of the material of literature. Whether the events of history,
domestic life, class relations, etc. are merely the ‘motivation of the
device’, pace early Formalism, or constitute the ideological content that
must be absorbed, transformed and represented in the literary ‘vessel’,
neither tendency doubts that it is indeed what is external to the literary
work, in the crudest of ontological terms, that constitutes its material.
Shklovskii’s conception of material as ‘absolutely indifferent’, in
Medvedev’s words, leads inexorably to ‘the devaluation of content’
(‘nizvedenie soderzhaniia’),24 damning evidence of Formalism’s
fear of meaning, which, with its ‘not here’ and ‘not now’ is able to destroy
the quiddity of the work and the fullness of its presence in the here and
now.25
Medvedev goes on to dismiss this — Shklovskian or early-Formalist —
conception of material in the following conclusive terms:
It is inadmissible to treat fabula (in the sense of a specific event ‘in life’),
the hero, the idea, and everything ideologically significant in general as
material, since all this does not exist as a given outside the work.26
What is remarkable, however, is that this would function also as a con-
vincing dismissal of a Marxist conception of the material of the literary
work, were we only to omit the word ‘fabula’ and replace it with the
gloss Medvedev provides in parentheses. Formalism’s devaluation of
content may ostensibly place it in diametrical opposition to Marxism,
but both extremes are in fact predicated on a broadly shared conception
of what the material of the literary work consists in. For the Formalists,
this pre-literary material may have been conceived predominantly in
terms of neutral experiential phenomena, the raw material for a
nascent narratology; for the Marxists, of course, it was profoundly
ideological, related more closely to the social context of any given
experiential phenomena and to their imbrication in ‘relations of
24 Medvedev, The Formal Method, pp. 148, 151; pp. 108, 110.
25 Ibid., p. 145; p. 105.
26 Ibid., p. 153; p. 112; my emphasis.
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production’, the basis for a nascent sociology of literature. For the For-
malist ‘fear of meaning’ read the Marxist ‘fear of form’. Formalism’s
expulsion of content and Marxism’s disregard for form are produced
by the same misconception of the material of the literary work.
In 1924, however, when Bakhtin first engaged the spectre of a ‘mate-
rial aesthetics’ in ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, which
was destined to remain unpublished until 1974–75, his dismissal of this
conception of material is only — and perhaps crushingly — implicit.
Bakhtin prefigures (and, in view of the publication history, echoes)
Medvedev’s objection to the conception of ‘life’ or ‘reality’ as in any
sense the raw material for the literary work, arguing that reality is
‘already thoroughly aestheticised’ (‘uzhe sushchestvenno estetizovana’)
prior to being brought into contact with art:
We must remember once and for all that there is no reality in itself, no neutral
reality which can be placed in opposition to art: in the act of talking about reality and
placing it in opposition to something, we also define and evaluate it in some particular
manner.27
Bakhtin too accuses ‘contemporary poetics’ of the ‘denial of content’
(‘otritsanie soderzhaniia’), by describing it either as an aspect of form,
or as an aspect of material.28 Bakhtin and Medvedev even employ an
apparently identical analogy in dismissing the idea of material as an
inert element of pre-creative reality, that of the sculptor working
marble. Here, however, we are forced to confront problematization
on two levels: first, we must at least acknowledge the question of the
authorship of The Formal Method, which remains more intractable than
Medevev’s and Bakhtin’s recourse to a similar analogy might suggest;29
second, and more importantly, their respective uses of the analogy
open new perspectives on the question of material itself.
27 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 278; p. 276.
28 Ibid., p. 284; p. 282.
29 As well as academic, ideological and even national factors, respective positions on the
question of authorship have been partly conditioned by the publication history of these texts,
in Russian and in English. It should at the very least be noted, however, that what little
documentary evidence there is tends to support Medvedev’s ‘physical’ authorship: see
[M. M. Bakhtin], Besedy V. D. Duvakina s M. M. Bakhtinym, Moscow, 1996, pp. 77–78; ‘Pis´ma
M. M. Bakhtina’, Literaturnaia ucheba, 4–5, 1992, pp. 144–52. See also Iu. P. Medvedev,
‘Pis´mo v redaktsiiu zhurnala “Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop”’, Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop, 4,
1995, pp. 148–56; Iu. P. Medvedev, ‘“Nas bylo mnogo na chelne . . .”’, Dialog. Karnaval.
Khronotop, 1, 1992, pp. 89–108.
For a summary of various approaches to the problem of authorship prior to the publica-
tion of Bakhtin’s 1961 letter to Vadim Kozhinov (in ‘Pis´ma M. M. Bakhtina’, above), see
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, Stanford, CA,
1990, pp. 101–19; for a survey of more recent contributions to the debate, and one that is
particularly attuned to the question of what is actually at stake — academically and ideologi-
cally — in this ostensibly neutral ‘question of fact’, see Ken Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin: An
Aesthetic for Democracy, Oxford, 1999, pp. 126–40.
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Medvedev’s use of the analogy is not only intended to force home his
rejection of the association of material and fabula: it is also a preface to
examination of a second and quite different conception of ‘material’,
which he attributes to Viktor Zhirmunskii and later, in modified form,
to Tynianov:
The word ‘material’ itself, as it is used here, is ambiguous in the highest
degree. [. . .] It seems to us that it is admissible to talk of material in art only
as something already found by the artist, and not as something created by
him according to an artistic plan. [. . .] It is possible to treat language as the
material of literature, as Zhirmunskii does, because language in its linguistic
specificity is indeed found by the individual artist.30
Medvedev, in search of something that might be said to ‘exist as a
given outside the work’ and is not ‘already thoroughly aestheticized’,
performs an act of subtle rhetorical sleight of hand: having denied the
validity of what we must now call the first Formalist conception of
material, for which we have used Shklovskii’s militant iconoclasm as
a convenient shorthand, Medvedev now identifies a second conception
of material, which he characterizes as both hyper-formalist and
hyper-abstract, but not ontologically and aesthetically impermissible.
Medvedev, as we shall see, questions the limitations of this second
Formalist conception of material as language, not its fundamental
tenability.
If Bakhtin were in fact the author of The Formal Method, however, we
would be obliged to term this an act of rhetorical regression. In ‘The
Problem of Content, Material and Form’, having paid scant attention
to the first conception of material in its association with fabula, which is
implicitly consigned to the ranks of the ‘unworthy’ opponent, Bakhtin
utilizes the analogy of a sculptor working marble in order to demon-
strate the inadequacy of this second conception of material as ‘language
in its linguistic specificity’; he anticipates, that is, the inadequacy of
what Medvedev turns his critical attentions to only after rejecting a
broadly Shklovskian notion of the relation of material and fabula. For
Bakhtin, in a polemic of a quite different character, the artist’s
‘axiological-artistic activity’ is directed not at what is ‘found’, but at the
‘aesthetically significant form of the human being and his body’, at the ‘aes-
thetic object’, which cannot simply be identified with the material from
which it is ‘made’.31 The realization of the artistic form is certainly
30 Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 153; p. 112. Medvedev has earlier cited Zhirmunskii’s
explicit statement of this principle from ‘Zadachi poetiki’ [1919], in V. M. Zhirmunskii,
Teoriia literatury. Poetika. Stilistika, Leningrad, 1977, pp. 15–55: Medvedev, The Formal Method,
p. 119; p. 85. The proposition that language is the material of literature is assumed, but not
discussed, in the article that is the most direct object of Bakhtin’s polemic in ‘The Problem
of Content, Material and Form’, namely V. M. Zhirmunskii, ‘K voprosu o “formal´nom
metode”’ [1923], in Teoriia literatury. Poetika. Stilistika, pp. 94–105.
31 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 267; p. 265.
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impossible without the marble, just as it is, incidentally, without the
chisel, which ‘is in no sense part of the artistic object’.32 Where the
material is verbal, Bakhtin argues, ‘the situation becomes somewhat
more complex and is not quite so obviously absurd at first glance [. . .]
but is in principle no different’.33 Material thus conceived — in terms
of the second Formalist conception of material — takes on a quasi-
instrumental character, and any ‘material aesthetics’ becomes a theory
of instrumentality, a theory of the ‘secondary, derivative’ (‘vtorichnyi,
proizvodnyi’) aspects of the artist’s relation to his or her object.
What is crucial here is that Bakhtin at no time associates material,
within the frame of Formalist poetics, with fabula, with the ethical and
experiential data that precede the literary work. He makes no attempt
to respond to Shklovskii’s inversion of the substance of life and the
mechanics of representation, and assumes from the beginning that
the operative Formalist definition of the material of verbal art is simply
‘the word in linguistics’ (‘slovo lingvistiki’), and that it is precisely
linguistics’ misprision of the nature of ‘the word’ which most urgently
requires redress. Medvedev, writing after Bakhtin, embarks on a
critique of the implications of conceiving of language as inert material,
and the artistic work as ‘organized material, as a thing’,34 only after he has
dealt with the ‘genetic core’ of Formalism, its first conception of mate-
rial. We are thus able to identify a certain distance between the exteri-
orized, performed ‘concrete utterances’ of Medvedev and Bakhtin on
this matter, despite their origins in an avowedly common conception.35
32 Ibid., p. 267; p. 265.
33 Ibid., p. 267; p. 265.
34 Ibid., p. 266; p. 264.
35 It must be noted, however, that the question of authorship is further complicated by the
orientation of ‘Uchenyi sal´erizm: o formal´nom (morfologicheskom) metode’, written in
late 1924 and published under Medvedev’s name in 1925. Here, as in ‘The Problem of Con-
tent, Material and Form’, the focus is emphatically on the second Formalist conception of
material, and we are left to attribute Medvedev’s later emphasis on the earlier Formalist con-
ception of material in The Formal Method to that book’s greater consistency with the political,
as opposed to theoretical, temper of the times. See P. N. Medvedev, ‘Uchenyi sal´erizm:
o formal´nom (morfologicheskom) metode’, Bakhtin pod maskoi. 5/1: Maska piataia, pervaia
polumaska, Moscow, 1996, pp. 10–24; see also Nikolai Nikolaev, ‘Publishing Bakhtin: A Philo-
logical Problem (Two Reviews)’, Dialogism, 4, 2000, pp. 67–111, which makes a detailed and
emphatic case for the common authorship of ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’
and ‘Uchenyi sal´erizm’, but which fails to sustain the implication that this extends also to
The Formal Method.
Tynianov’s ‘O literaturnom fakte’, which was published between the writing of ‘The
Problem of Content, Material and Form’ and ‘Uchenyi sal´erizm’, is cited in the latter.
There are, as we shall see, grounds for assuming that it is Tynianov’s particular develop-
ment of Formalism in the second half of the 1920s that provokes Medvedev’s greater differ-
entiation between the two Formalist conceptions of material in The Formal Method; or, in
other words, that it is Tynianov who ‘lays bare’ the instability of the Formalist approach to
material. See Iu. N. Tynianov, ‘O literaturnom fakte’, Lef, 2, 1924, pp. 101–16; cited from Iu.
N. Tynianov, ‘Literaturnyi fakt’, in Arkhaisty i novatory, Leningrad, 1929, pp. 5–29 (hereafter,
Tynianov, ‘Literaturnyi fakt’).
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Bakhtin is not primarily concerned with the earlier Formalist concep-
tion of material, and in fact never directly refers to it. The corollary of
such a conception, i.e. the usurpation of ideologically significant
content by the technical ‘device’, is implicitly rejected in the discussion
of the ‘already aestheticized’ nature of reality and Formalism’s ‘denial
of content’ to which we have already referred, but the conception itself
is apparently unworthy of explicit response.36
Bakhtin concentrates instead upon the second Formalist conception
of material, the later proposition that it is language itself that must be
considered the material of literature and, crucially, the fundamentally
conflicting conclusions that may flow from this premise. This in a sense
marks not the end, but the beginning of Bakhtin’s engagement with
Formalism; it is possible to imagine Bakhtin and, say, Zhirmunskii
provisionally agreeing that language must in some way be the material
of the literary work, but any consequent definitions of the function of
material and of the processes involved in its transformation in aesthetic
activity remain separated by their fundamentally opposed conceptions
of language itself. Bakhtin will later take linguistics to task for its impov-
erished conception of what he insists on terming living language,37 but
at this early stage in his own engagement with language it is the imper-
ialism of linguistics, as opposed to its inadequacy (nonetheless
implied), which is of primary concern: linguistic analysis should restrict
itself to the ‘mastery’ (ovladenie) of its own object (in which respect it has
not progressed beyond the complex sentence), rather than speculating
on the ‘significance [of the purely linguistic particularities of language
itself] for art, for science and for religion’, a task more appropriate for
aesthetics and for cognitive science.38 Essentially, Bakhtin accuses lin-
guistics of attempting to pass itself off as aesthetics, to subsume analysis
of the aesthetic nature and function of verbal art in its own implicitly
inappropriate methodologies. More specifically, he accuses ‘contempo-
rary poetics’, increasingly convinced of the significance of a simplisti-
cally conceived linguistic material basis for literature, of coalescing with
abstract linguistics in a project that will culminate in the ‘impoverish-
ment’ (obednenie) of the object of poetics, and even ‘the replacement
[podmena] of this object [. . .] with something quite different’.39
36 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, pp. 278, 284; pp. 276, 282. This
is also an important theoretical premise of Bakhtin’s brief analysis of Pushkin’s ‘Remem-
brance’ (Vospominanie): Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, pp. 297–300;
pp. 296–98.
37 ‘The word is not a thing’ (‘Slovo ne veshch´’), Bakhtin later writes in his book on
Dostoevskii: Problemy tvorchestva/poetiki Dostoevskogo, Kiev, 1994, p. 418; Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, Minneapolis and London, 1984, p. 202.
38 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 293; p. 292.
39 Ibid., p. 260; p. 258.
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The immediately perceived danger is thus the enlistment of an
abstract linguistic analysis in the construction of a new ‘immanent’
poetics. Despite the ‘undoubted productiveness and significance’ of
certain works produced by ‘representatives of the so-called formal or
morphological method’,40 the problem is that
poetics clings tightly to linguistics, fearing to take more than a single step
away from it (in the case of the majority of the formalists and of V. M.
Zhirmunskii), and sometimes even directly striving to become only a
division of it (in the case of V. V. Vinogradov).
For poetics, as for any specialised aesthetics, in which it is necessary to
take account of the nature of the material (in the present case — verbal) as
well as general aesthetic principles, linguistics is of course necessary as a
subsidiary discipline; but here it begins to occupy a completely inappropri-
ate leading position, almost precisely the position which should be occupied
by general aesthetics.41
III
The implications of this for our understanding of the history of Formal-
ism in Russia, and of its later impact in the West, are quite startling:
the Formalists, it would appear, despite a certain tendency towards
terminological innovation, had no fixed conception of the material of
the literary work. This has been noted, but by no means resolved, by
Viktor Erlich in his Russian Formalism: History — Doctrine, which asks
whether ‘material’ constitutes ‘the subject matter of reality embodied in
literature, or its medium, language’. Erlich’s revealing answer is that,
although ‘there was apparently no complete unanimity among the
Formalist and near-Formalist spokesmen’ on this matter, the ‘latter
interpretation appears to have prevailed’ (this extremely tentative non-
conclusion is preceded, incidentally, by conflicting instances drawn
from Shklovskii, who ‘paid his due to both rival interpretations; consis-
tency or terminological neatness was not his forte’).42 The extent to
which this constitutes a congenital flaw in the Formalist ‘system’,
as implied by Bakhtin — a material aesthetics founded on a mis-
comprehension of ‘material’ itself — or, alternatively, a defence against
that same implication, will be the subject of later remarks. The implica-
tions — albeit secondary — for our understanding of Bakhtin’s
relations to one of his co-thinkers, however, are somewhat clearer:
there is something of a paradox in the fact that the earlier work,
40 Ibid., p. 261; p. 258.
41 Ibid., p. 263; p. 261.
42 Viktor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History — Doctrine, The Hague, 1980 [1955], p. 189.
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unquestionably Bakhtin’s, pays almost no explicit attention to the earlier
stage of Formalism’s development, virtually ignoring, as we have seen,
the first Formalist definition of material; Medvedev’s later work,
although its scope covers the period in the mid-1920s when this concep-
tion of material (along with much else in Formalist thinking) undergoes
fundamental revision, nevertheless dwells on the ‘genetic core’ of
Formalism, the foundational principles his analysis will not allow it to
overcome, and moves only belatedly onto the ground Bakhtin occupies
from the outset.
The contribution of another of Bakhtin’s co-thinkers is relevant both
to the theoretical and to the bio-bibliographical aspects of the problem.
Voloshinov’s 1926 article ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry’
has also been attributed to Bakhtin but, like The Formal Method, also
lends credence to the hypothesis of distinct authorship when read as a
contribution to the problem of material. Distinguishing two ‘false’
views of literary production, the first concentrating on the psychology
of either author or reader, the second banishing both author and
reader alike in favour of ‘the fetishization of the artistic work as a thing’,43
Voloshinov, using a qualifier that was increasingly favoured by the
Formalists themselves, names the ‘so-called Formal method’ as a
species of the latter:44
For [the Formal method] the poetic work is verbal material, organized in a
particular manner by form. Further, [the Formal method] takes discourse not
as a sociological entity, but from an abstract linguistic point of view. [. . .]
Understood more broadly, however, as a product of cultural interaction,
discourse ceases to be a self-sufficient object and can no longer be under-
stood independently of the social situation that has produced it. [. . .] In
fact, if we remain within the limits of the objectified aspect of art, it is
impossible even to indicate the boundaries of the material and those aspects
of it that have artistic significance. Material itself combines directly with the
surrounding extra-artistic environment and possesses an endless quantity
of facets and definitions — mathematical, physical, chemical and, finally,
linguistic.45
43 The second of these is in fact doubly false in Voloshinov’s view, in that it merely
pretends to scientific objectivity, but ultimately, and inevitably in view of the fundamental
nature of the object of the human sciences, smuggles in its own ‘subjectivist’ contraband:
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 277; p. 62.
44 By the mid-1920s in Russia it had become almost compulsory to enclose the terms ‘For-
mal Method’ and ‘Formalism’ firmly in inverted commas, or even to preface them with the
epithet ‘so-called’ (‘tak nazyvaemyi’). This practice was by no means restricted to opponents
of Formalism: see for example, Osip Brik, ‘Tak nazyvaemyi formal´nyi metod’, Lef, 1, 1923,
pp. 213–15; ‘The So-called Formal Method’, Russian Poetics in Translation, 4, 1977 (Formalist
Theory), pp. 90–91.
45 Voloshinov, ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry’, p. 63; p. 8.
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Here, as elsewhere in ‘Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry’,
Voloshinov echoes Bakhtin’s and Medvedev’s concerns regarding
contemporary poetics’ illusion of immanence, its fetishization/
reification of the literary work, its fatal attraction to abstract linguistics,
and its inability to distinguish verbal art from the merely verbal;
he also, however, makes quite explicit what has been only implicit in
Bakhtin’s prior treatment in ‘The Problem of Content, Material
and Form’ — namely that the problem does not lie in conceiving of
material as language, but rather in conceiving of language itself as abstract.
Although Voloshinov prefaces his definition of material by opposing
the equally ‘false’ paths of the immanent approach to the literary work
(Formalism) and the psychological subjectivism that has characterized
traditional literary criticism, these are not dialectically opposed, and
Voloshinov does not seek their synthesis. Voloshinov’s proposed devel-
opment is in fact much more subtle and unexpected. He refers, as we
have already seen, to Sakulin’s attempt to develop a more sophisticated
‘sociological method’ by distinguishing the ‘immanent’ and ‘causal’
series in which literary works have their existence, and in terms of
which they must be studied. Voloshinov, however, although ostensibly
writing from a broadly Marxist point of view, is not concerned to
adjudicate between the claims of the ‘immanent’ and the ‘sociological’
approaches conceived in these terms, and rejects the idea that socio-
logical analysis (historical, social, diachronic) will properly follow and
‘complete’ immanent analysis (poetic, synchronic). Voloshinov takes us
beyond the initial problem we have identified with Sakulin’s ‘staggered’
methodology, i.e. that critical practice would always tend to emphasize
one phase in this process at the expense of the other, and offers instead
a quite distinct methodological alternative, which is attentive to, and
indeed predicated on, the problem of material. Voloshinov does not
offer the ‘sociological method’ as a straightforward alternative to the
immanent, asocial specification of contemporary poetics (Formalism),
but seeks instead to transform the sociological method into a sociological
poetics, which will reject the methodological distinction between ‘imma-
nent’ and ‘causal’ just as it rejects the separation of material into verbal
and non-verbal. The sociological method is reproached for having failed
to ‘make a single serious attempt to study by its own methods the
so-called immanent structure of the artistic work’.46 But how could it?
It must let others, poeticians, complete that task before it comes into
its rights. Alternatively, in a manner that prefigures the later direction
of Soviet literary criticism, sociological analysis might precede poetic
analysis, leaving for the latter only relative irrelevancies. For
Voloshinov, however, ‘sociological’ and ‘immanent’ are merely terms
46 Ibid., p. 60; p. 6.
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of a false opposition, and the question of which should precede the
other is therefore obviated. They are, moreover, founded on the false
opposition from which we began, which in turn produces alternative,
but equally problematic conceptions of material: sociological analysis
takes the first Formalist conception of material as its starting point, then
proceeding to the question of its expression in linguistic form; imma-
nent analysis begins from the second conception of material, and only
then (if indeed at all) considers the relationship of the material of the
literary work to the material of ‘life’. A conception of material that
unifies linguistic phenomena (the former domain of immanent analysis)
and extra-linguistic phenomena (the former domain of sociological
analysis) methodologically nullifies the distinction between immanent
and sociological approaches. Voloshinov finally defines art as ‘imma-
nently sociological’ (‘immanentno-sotsiologichno’) and, in what is
an alternative description of the dynamics of our new conception of
material,
the extra-artistic social environment, which influences [art] from without,
finds in it a direct internal response. It is not a case of one alien entity influ-
encing another, but rather of one social construction influencing another.47
All of the ‘false’ or partial approaches to which Voloshinov refers —
the immanent approach, the sociological approach, even the discred-
ited psychological subjectivist approaches of the ‘pre-scientific’ era
— share a common tendency to mistake the part for the whole. In
Voloshinov’s analysis the misprisions of these partial approaches to the
study of literature are mirrored perfectly by their respective and fatally
partial accounts of literary material. Although Medvedev and Bakhtin
have been equally scathing in their diagnoses, neither (at least to this
point, in the case of Bakhtin) has offered the means to overcome these
methodological deficiencies; Voloshinov, however, ultimately demands
a conflation of the alternative and apparently mutually inimical
sociological and immanent critical approaches, a conflation which is
predicated upon an entirely new conception of literary material. For
Voloshinov, the material of the literary work is indeed language, but
language understood as a:
particular form of social interaction, which is realized and fixed in the material of the
artistic work.48
Voloshinov thus gestures towards the possibility of a new ‘poetics’,
towards the literary strand of a new ‘material aesthetics’, which will be
founded on the inseparability of real-life phenomena and speech or, in
other words, on the indivisibility of material.
47 Ibid., p. 62; p. 7.
48 Ibid., p. 64; p. 9.
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This is the critical link between Bakhtin’s ‘The Problem of Content,
Material and Form’ and Medvedev’s later discussion of an embryonic
‘translinguistics’ in The Formal Method, which develops Bakhtin’s tenta-
tive proposition of ‘the utterance’ as the basic unit of a concrete (as
opposed to abstract) linguistics in the light of Voloshinov’s programmatic
re-definition of material. Medvedev identifies the missing link ‘which
unites the material presence of the word with its meaning’ as ‘social
evaluation’ (‘sotsial´naia otsenka’).49 Thus social evaluation can have
nothing to do with the linguistic example, which is only a ‘conditional
utterance’ (‘uslovnoe vyskazyanie’), as opposed to the ‘concrete speech
performance’ (‘konkretnoe rechevoe vystuplenie’) that is the social
utterance;50 and thus poetry itself (and by extension all literary pro-
duction) must be understood not as a hermetically-sealed domain for
conveniently abstract linguistic analysis, but as a type of concrete utterance,
cognate with a limitless range of other types of utterance associated
with the various non-literary locations of linguistic performance.51 Or,
to return to the specific terms of the present analysis, having rejected
the earlier Formalist conception of material as the motivation of device,
Medvedev voices a unified Bakhtinian rejection of the second
conception of material as language in arguing that:
Language, understood as a totality or system of linguistic possibilities
(phonetic, grammatical, lexical), is, least of all, the material of poetry.
The poet chooses not linguistic forms, but rather the evaluations that are
deposited in them.52
Bakhtin’s ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, in which this
principle finds its earliest statement, is famously prefaced by his asser-
tion of the article’s freedom ‘from the superfluous ballast of citation and
reference, [. . .] unnecessary for the competent reader, and of no help
whatever to the incompetent reader’.53 This, as we have seen, is thrown
into yet more dramatic relief by Medvedev’s later emphasis on the
49 Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 162; p. 119.
50 Ibid., p. 166; p. 122.
51 Ibid. pp. 171–74; pp. 126–28. Properly speaking, the cross-reference here should be to
Voloshinov, the most expansive and explicit proponent of the social basis of language
among the Bakhtin school: see part two of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.
52 Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 166; p. 122.
53 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 259; p. 257. Bakhtin may not
in fact be referring to the immediate critical debate, from which no interested party could be
immune, but to the so-called European formalism of Wölfflin, Hildebrand, Fiedler and
Worringer, to which Medvedev later devotes a chapter of The Formal Method, ‘The Formal
Method in European Art Scholarship’. We should, however, be careful in attributing too
much significance to these sources, as indeed is Medvedev: ‘It is true that it is not possible to
show that our formalists directly depended on their Western-European predecessors. To all
appearances there was no direct genetic connection between them. Our formalists generally
rely on no one and cite no one other than themselves’: Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 59;
p. 41. Compare Rosaliia Shor’s bad-tempered dismissal of Formalist ignorance of what she
characterizes as a long tradition of formal analysis in Western, and particularly German,
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earlier Formalist conception of material in The Formal Method. The issue
of Bakhtin’s actual engagement with early Formalism is thus buried
under a layer of doubt and depends on the willingness of the reader to
‘trust’ Bakhtin, who does make repeated, if unsupported reference to the
presumably more ‘worthy opponent’ Zhirmunskii.54
IV
That Medvedev should focus in his analysis of a second Formalist
conception of material not on Zhirmunskii, but on Tynianov, to whom
Bakhtin makes no direct reference is, however, wholly consistent with
the time of writing.55 Medvedev’s acknowledgement of at least the
53 Continued
scholarship: R. O. Shor, ‘Formal´nyi metod na zapade’, in Ars Poetica, 1, ed. M. A.
Petrovskii, Moscow, 1927, pp. 127–43.
Alternatively, Bakhtin may be deliberately choosing to ‘engage the other’ in a manner
that later Western scholarship has found scandalous: see for example Ladislav Matejka,
‘Deconstructing Bakhtin’, in C. A. Mihailescu and W. Hamarneh (eds), Fiction Updated:
Theories of Fictionality, Narratology and Poetics, Toronto, 1996, pp. 257–66, which situates the
origins of Bakhtin’s ideas on form and material in an unacknowledged debt to Broder
Christiansen’s Philosophie der Kunst [1909]. For an overview of the philosophical sources that
may have conditioned Bakhtin’s approach to questions of form and material, see Craig
Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture, Politics, London and Sterling, VA, 2002,
pp. 15–52.
54 Bakhtin also later makes explicit reference to Eikhenbaum as a preface to his discussion
of the various literary forms of double-voiced discourse in the first edition of his book on
Dostoevskii, Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo, in Bakhtin, Problemy tvorchestva/poetiki Dostoevskogo,
p. 90, p. 406. For the English translation, see Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 191.
See also the direct refutation of Shklovskii’s ‘the word is a thing’, on which we have already
commented, a moment at which Bakhtin’s ‘polemic’ with Formalism is anything but
‘hidden’ (notes 19 and 37 above).
The question of Bakhtin’s engagement of his specifically Formalist ‘other’ forms the
backdrop to Michael Holquist’s ‘Bakhtin and the Formalists: History as Dialogue’, in Robert
Louis Jackson and Stephen Rudy (eds), Russian Formalism: A Retrospective Glance, New Haven,
CT, 1985, pp. 82–95, in which Holquist sets up an opposition between Bakhtin as a ‘Russian
thinker sponsored by American Slavic Departments’ and as a ‘subfunction of the Parisian
redaction of Formalism’ (p. 82); see also Igor´ Shaitanov, ‘Zhanrovoe slovo u Bakhtina i
formalistov’, Voprosy literatury, May–June, 1996, pp. 89–114; ‘The Concept of the Generic
Word: Bakhtin and the Russian Formalists’, in Carol Adlam et al. (eds), Face to Face: Bakhtin
in Russia and the West, Sheffield, 1997, pp. 233–53.
55 Bakhtin may not have been aware at this stage of Tynianov’s ‘Oda kak oratorskii zhanr’,
published in 1922, although its path-breaking confrontation of the relationship between
literature and ‘not literature’ would later prove highly significant for the Bakhtin school:
Tynianov, Poetika, pp. 227–52. Direct reference to Tynianov in Bakhtin is, somewhat iron-
ically, limited to an entirely negative assessment of the former’s literary output, mediated
through the ‘private’ lecture notes taken by R. M. Mirkina between 1922 and 1927:
‘Tynianov [. . .] has neither the style nor the language that would allow him to create an
artistic work. ‘Kiukhlia’ is only fit to be a reading book for the middle school. Lev Tolstoi
[. . .] worked for many years on the materials for War and Peace. Tynianov has produced his
work in two weeks’: M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Lektsii po russkoi literature (1922–1927 gg.)’, Dialog.
Karnaval. Khronotop, 1, 1993, 2, pp. 97–104. The Russian material or materialy are here used in
the conventional sense of ‘sources’, without any implicit reference to the theoretical problem
we are addressing.
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possibility of change in the Formalist conception of material is made
with his by now familiar rhetorical scepticism. His description and
rejection of a ‘Second Conception of “Material” in Tynianov’ is pref-
aced by a restatement of his conviction that the first Formalist concep-
tion of material ‘is a crucial and inalienable component part of the
formalist system’.56 Equally, in confirming that Tynianov conceives of
material ‘as language, and not at all as motivation of the device’,
Medvedev characterizes this as an ‘adherence [. . .] to Zhirmunskii’s
concept of material’, and one which is accompanied by occasional
lapses in the direction of the earlier conception, ‘without any method-
ological account’.57 Two works published in 1924 would appear to con-
firm Medvedev’s judgement: The Problem of Verse Language opens with an
apparently unequivocal statement of the specifically verbal nature of
material, and the conviction that the central question for literary
studies is the relationship of such material to what Tynianov calls ‘the
constructive principle’, the means by which material is transformed in
the literary process;58 in ‘Literaturnyi fakt’, however, Tynianov appears
to vacillate between the earlier and later conceptions of material, at
times confirming the essential interaction of ‘verbal material’ (‘rechevoi
material’) and the constructive factors which organize it, at times
indeed ‘lapsing’ into consideration of pre-literary historical or experien-
tial elements of a potential fabula as the material to which constructive
factors are ‘applied’.59 This apparent inconsistency in Tynianov’s
reformulation of the concept of material might equally, however, be
attributed to the ground-breaking nature of his thinking, and indeed to
his own uncertainty with regard to all of its implications.60 The Problem
of Verse Language, however, is not just a clear acknowledgement of
the growing influence of the association of material and language
in his thinking; it also, and crucially, signals the beginnings of a
problematization of the relationship between verbal and ‘non-verbal’
56 Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 159; p. 116.
57 Ibid., pp. 160, 159; p. 117. In a gesture that might suggest a deepening of the spiral of
influence operative in the process of Formalism’s transmission, Albert J. Wehrle’s English
translation of The Formal Method here uses the quite unwarranted expression ‘haphazard’,
precisely the same term Erlich has used to characterize the broader ‘retreat’ of late Formalism
(Erlich, Russian Formalism, p. 129).
58 Iu. N. Tynianov, Problema stikhotvornogo iazyka, The Hague, 1963 [1924]; The Problem of
Verse Language, ed. and trans. Michael Sosa and Brent Harvey, Ann Arbor, MI, 1981.
59 Tynianov, ‘Literaturnyi fakt’, p. 16; p. 19.
60 Vladimir Novikov concedes a ‘definite, although historically excusable’ lack of ‘explicit
development of the concept of material in all its aspects and nuances’ in the work of
Tynianov and his colleagues: Iu. N. Tynianov, Literaturnaia evoliutsiia: izbrannye trudy, ed.
Vladimir Novikov, Moscow, 2002, p. 476. On the other hand, Medvedev, perhaps not sur-
prisingly in view of our earlier discussion, is elsewhere prepared to call Tynianov ‘the most
cautious, restrained and academic of the formalist leaders’: P. N. Medvedev, Formalizm i
formalisty, Leningrad, 1934, p. 171.
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material, and indeed a questioning of the fundamental tenability of
such a distinction.61
Tynianov establishes verbal material as the first locus for the study of
verbal art by referring not simply to material, but to ‘shaped material,
the simplest conventional marker of which is speech, the word’.62 The
qualifier ‘shaped’ (oformliaemyi) might initially appear to imply that
Tynianov persists in conceiving of a fundamental separation between
material and its linguistic expression (its ‘vessel’): that is, that he persists
in the positivist illusion which has on occasion distracted Shklovskii,
and which allows the artist only to find and ‘shape’ material, but not to
create it. The more critical inference, however, is that it is impossible to
speak of any cultural or experiential phenomena as simply ‘found’. This is borne
out by Tynianov’s development in ‘Literaturnyi fakt’ of the idea that
the literary work is essentially the application (prilozhenie) of the con-
structive factor to linguistic material, it comes into being in the process
of the ‘shaping of the material’ (‘v oformlenii materiala’).63 Cultural,
historical or experiential phenomena, the ‘material’ of the earlier
Formalist conception, must always be constructed (indeed, to an extent,
they already are constructed) in the medium of language; in other
words, ‘there is no reality in itself, no neutral reality which can be placed in
opposition to art’, because ‘life’ and ‘reality’ are ‘already thoroughly
aestheticized’.64 Moreover, this process of construction, whether or not
it is specifically related to the creation of a specifically ‘literary’ work,
61 Marc Weinstein has made a detailed study of the (four) different denotations of the term
‘material’ in Tynianov, but with the rather unfortunate purpose of distancing him from
Bakhtin, whose aesthetics are characterized merely as a contradictory recapitulation of their
essentially Kantian roots. Weinstein, ironically in view of the present article’s (and
Tynianov’s own) emphasis on evolution, is content to leave Bakhtin frozen in 1924, which is
the equivalent — if it is not in fact much worse — of insisting on Tynianov’s unseverable
association with early Formalism; see Marc Weinstein, ‘Le débat Tynjanov / Bakhtin ou la
question du matériau’, Revue des Études Slaves, 64, 1992, 2, pp. 297–322.
Aleksander Skaza, by way of contrast, offers a highly sensitized reading of the signifi-
cance of material in Bakhtin, but persists in opposing this to an undifferentiated Formalist
‘position’, which not only encompasses Tynianov and Shklovskii, but also encompasses —
and effaces — the chronological development of each of their respective positions; see
Aleksander Skaza, ‘Kontseptsiia “material’noi estetiki” M. M. Bakhtina v polemike s
formal´nym metodom: neskol´ko zametok’, in Miha Javornik et al. (eds), Bakhtin and the
Humanities: Proceedings of the International Conference in Ljubljana, October 19–21, 1995, Ljubljana,
1997, pp. 45–55.
62 Tynianov, The Problem of Verse Language, p. 7; p. 31.
63 Tynianov, ‘Literaturnyi fakt’, p. 15.
64 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 278; p. 276. Here, as on
many occasions in the essay, Bakhtin’s subject matter and terminology clearly construct one
section of his anticipated audience as being familiar with the neo-Kantian struggle with ide-
alism and, in conjunction with his earlier remark about the ‘ballast of citation’, ironically
signals the relative ignorance of the remainder — among whom, presumably, number his
formalist opponents. The philosophical sources of Bakhtin, and in particular questions of
influence, are not, however, the concern of the present article; see in this respect, Brandist,
The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture, Politics.
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already and in itself implies the construction also of form:65 ‘material’ is in
no way opposed to ‘form’; material is also ‘formal’, because it does not exist
outwith the constructive [factor].66
The ground of this all-encompassing, harmonizing resolution of the
problem of material in the literary work offers the strongest clue as to
why this problem has provoked such varying expositions in the work of
the various Formalist critics, in the work of Tynianov himself (some-
times, apparently, within a single work), and in the different critical
responses to these works authored by Medvedev and Bakhtin.
Tynianov does not in fact replace one conception of material with
another, as Medvedev suggests: he conflates both of those conceptions in
a formulation that has the unexpected capacity to resist:
1. Medvedev’s derision of the early Formalist tendency to treat fabula
as material ‘since all this does not exist as a given outside the
work’;67
2. Bakhtin’s and Medvedev’s criticism of the ‘abstraction’ of language
which is implied by its conception as ‘inert’ material. Tynianov
implicitly rejects ‘language understood as a totality or system of
linguistic possibilities (phonetic, grammatical, lexical)’ as the basis
for a theorization of literary material,68 and in so doing overcomes
Bakhtin’s stricture against seeing the literary work as merely
‘organized material, as a thing’.69
There is no such thing as ‘material’ without language but, equally, to
equate material with language is to include in its definition all the
varied cultural, historical and experiential phenomena previously asso-
ciated with fabula and the motivation of the device. Tynianov combines
both conceptions of material on the grounds of the fundamental
inseparability of phenomena ‘in life’ and the myriad forms of their
linguistic instantiation (construction). Or, at least, Tynianov allows us
to infer such a conflation, and it has been left to his present-day editor,
Vladimir Novikov, to (re)state this new conception of material in the
following terms:
Material is the entire pre-creative reality of the artistic work: its real-life or
historical basis; the range of abstract ideas reflected in it; the totality of
extra-aesthetic emotions and natural and objective realities recreated by the
author; and language in its linguistic specificity.70
65 The critical distinction here is not that between literary and non-literary, but between
externalized (artistically represented, pragmatically expressed) and ‘inner’ speech, which
ultimately determines the entire question of form and genre in Bakhtin.
66 Tynianov, ‘Literaturnyi fakt’, p. 15.
67 Medvedev, The Formal Method, p. 153; p. 112; and above.
68 Ibid. p. 166; p. 122; and above.
69 Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 266; p. 264; and above.
70 Tynianov/Novikov, Literaturnaia evoliutsiia, p. 475; my emphasis — AR.
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This is not only a useful resolution of the difficulties in Tynianov’s
reformulation of the concept of material, it defines also the point at
which his direct comparison with Bakhtin becomes productive for the
latter — the basis, that is, for a response to the question of precisely
how reality is aestheticized in the different phases of verbal artistic
creation. What is initially astonishing and yet ultimately crucial in
Novikov’s summary is not the particular terms in which he chooses to
characterize the first three, apparently ‘non- or extra-verbal’ compo-
nents of ‘the entire pre-creative reality of the artistic work’, but rather
what is implied about the relationship between these three categories
and the final one, ‘language in its linguistic specificity’. Language
is freed from abstraction and ‘inertness’ in the act of being forced to
cohabit with or, better, to inhabit, to bring into being what was previously
mistaken for ‘non-linguistic’ content: just as material cannot be ‘form-
less’, neither can it be emptied of content (which itself, in turn, cannot
be conceived in isolation from language).
Tynianov’s reformulation of the concept of literary material rests on
the dual idea that language and ‘reality’ (and art) cannot be separated,
and that literary material is formed in the process of concrete verbal
performance. He comes close to an outright statement of the mutually
constitutive relationship of language and ideological or experiential
‘phenomena’ (we should properly call them ‘possibilities’) as early as
1924, in ‘Literaturnyi fakt’. His stance might, therefore, be termed
almost ‘Bakhtinian’ in its recognition that language itself can only be
conceived in terms of concrete performance (the outward manifestation
of which, in the present case, is writing).71 We should note also that all
of this, although directed at resolution of the problem of literary mate-
rial, does not necessarily imply the ‘reliance’ of reality upon specifically
literary instances of aesthetic embodiment; aesthetic activity is, for
Bakhtin, a component of any conscious interaction with the world, and
Tynianov will also come close to this position in the 1927 essay
‘On Literary Evolution’.72 It does appear, however, to present certain
logical difficulties, inasmuch as ‘reality’ does rely for its ‘existence’ upon
aesthetic construction, which includes, but is not restricted to, the liter-
ary or artistic; Tynianov appears to run the risk, as Medvedev has
indeed suggested, of obliterating literary material in the act of defining
it.
71 Although any linguistic performance is processual, and cannot be reduced to or wholly
identified with its outward manifestation, it is the point at which the process acquires an
outward form that must dominate any analysis within a specifically literary-critical frame.
72 Iu. N. Tynianov, ‘O literaturnoi evoliutsii’ [1927], in Poetika. Istoriia literatury. Kino,
pp. 270–81; ‘On Literary Evolution’, in Matejka and Pomorska (eds), Readings in Russian
Poetics, pp. 66–78 (hereafter, Tynianov, ‘On Literary Evolution’).
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Here again, however, Medvedev’s characterization of Tynianov is
wholly predicated on the latter’s past associations. Medvedev has
explicitly associated Tynianov with the refutation of the first Formalist
conception of material, but he is unable or unwilling to accept that this
implies also a refutation of the other pillar of early Formalist theory we
remarked upon briefly at the outset, namely the distinctiveness of a
specifically ‘poetic’ language. Medvedev’s criticism is that Tynianov’s
second conception of material, as well as its problematic association
with the abstractions of linguistics, also fatally undermines the idea of
a distinctively and definitively literary language. This is essentially a
repetition of the global Bakhtinian criticism of Formalism, to the effect
that the Formalists have been consistently unable, even in their own
terms, to conceptualize the distinction between the literary and what is
verbal/textual but non-literary.73 Yet Tynianov has, at the very least,
long been uninterested in this task; indeed, in terms of his own pub-
lished work as opposed to references to the work of his colleagues,
it is possible to argue that it never was of primary concern to him. His
ostensible apostasy from Formalist ‘orthodoxy’ is characterized by
Medvedev as being born of inconsistency, an inevitable consequence
of the flawed initial premise of the Formalist project. Yet Tynianov’s
apostasy results not in his identification with the ‘other side’ of
the material aesthetic coin, with the ‘Marxist’ establishment to which
Shklovskii’s political manoeuvrings point;74 and nor does it necessarily
lead to his canonical association with the later of rise of Structuralism,
which seized upon Tynianov and Jakobson’s proposed resolution of the
problem of synchrony and diachrony in terms of systemic evolution,
but paid little or no attention to the underlying conception of material
73  ‘Without a systematic concept of the aesthetic [. . .] it is impossible to isolate the object
of poetics — the artistic verbal work — from the mass of verbal works of a different kind’:
Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, p. 261; p. 259.
74 Compare in this respect Shklovskii’s changing relations with Eikhenbaum, who had
gone furthest towards accommodating Marxism in his articles ‘Literatura i pisatel´’, Zvezda,
5, 1927, pp. 121–40, and ‘Literaturnyi byt’ [1927, as ‘Literatura i literaturnyi byt’], in Boris
Eikhenbaum, Moi vremennik / Marshrut v bessmertie, Moscow, 2001, pp. 49–59. Shklovskii could
write to Jakobson in February 1929, at the height of his attempt to resurrect Opoiaz, that
‘[Eikhenbaum’s] “literary environment” is the most vulgar Marxism. Besides, he has
become jealous and is afraid of his own students’ (cited from Galushkin, ‘“I tak, stavshi
na kostiakh . . .”’, p. 140); and yet, by the end of the year, Eikhenbaum and Shklovskii had
co-edited Slovesnost´ i kommertsiia. Knizhnaia lavka A. F. Smirdina, Moscow, 2001 [1929], whose
editorial introduction claims that while ‘the authors of this book in no way contend that the
so-called “literary environment” (B. M. Eikhenbaum’s term) is a primary cause of literary
evolution [. . .] they do consider that analysis of the literary environment might provide
materials for an analysis of changes in the function of literature in different periods’
(pp. 5–6).
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which is the necessary precondition of that evolution.75 It leads instead
to his rejection of both sides of the material aesthetic coin, and to his
association, ex post facto as it must inevitably be, with Bakhtin.
Tynianov’s response to the ultimate crisis of Formalism, a response
that had been formulating itself for some time, was to turn to historical
fiction (and, to a lesser extent, to a sober literary-historical criticism).76
Whatever the status of ‘Problems in the Study of Literature and Lan-
guage’, his last overt statement before adopting a theoretical ‘silence’,
Tynianov’s penultimate — and perhaps most substantial — theoretical
statement points in a slightly different direction. ‘On Literary Evolu-
tion’, first published prior to Shklovskii’s final abortive attempt to
recover a secure institutional base for the broad ‘Formal school’,
certainly shares the central problematic of ‘Problems in the Study of
Literature and Language’ (and of Structuralism in general) in its exami-
nation of the relationship between the literary and extra-literary series
(which has also, and not at all incidentally, been at the heart of
attempts at rapprochement between Formalists and Marxists). What
has received less attention, however, is that Tynianov here approaches
the global question of the literary vis-à-vis the extra-literary by identify-
ing new and quite stunning implications of his conflated conception of
material. Turning to the question of literary genre, Tynianov argues
that
The Novel, which seems to be an integral genre that has developed in and
of itself over the centuries, turns out not to be an integral whole, but rather
a variable, with material that varies from one literary system to another,
and with varying methods of introducing extra-literary speech material into
literature.77
Tynianov turns to the question of genre not simply because it has been
‘less studied’, but because it offers itself as the mechanism through
which the effects and processes affecting ‘material’ can, quite literally,
be observed: if Tynianov’s conception of material accords with
75 Tynianov and Jakobson, ‘Problems in the Study of Literature and Language’, pp. 282–
83; pp. 79–81.
76 Although see, for example, Tynianov’s agonized letter to Shklovskii at the end of March
1929: ‘I am a little lost, I don’t have a major work and I’m afraid I’ve lost the habit of work-
ing on history and theory. But I have absolutely no intention of becoming a novelist’ (‘Iu.
Tynianov to V. Shklovskii, 29 March 1929’, Voprosy literatury, 12, 1984, pp. 199–200).
77 Tynianov, ‘On Literary Evolution’, pp. 274–75; p. 70. The Russian term byt has here
been translated simply as ‘the extra-literary’ in recognition of its core meaning in this con-
text; alternatives such as ‘domestic life’, ‘everyday life’ or ‘environment’ carry additional
connotations, which detract from an understanding of the term in specific opposition to ‘the
literary’ (as does Matejka and Pomorska’s rendering ‘social conventions’).
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Bakhtin’s insistence on its already ‘necessarily aestheticized’ condition,
genre is the category that allows us to establish precisely how reality is
aestheticized in the different phases of the history of verbal art:
how and by what means does the extra-literary correlate to literature? The
extra-literary is complex and multi-faceted in nature, and only the function
of all its elements is specific in it. The extra-literary correlates to literature
above all in its verbal aspect. [. . .] There are no ready-made literary genres.
Their place is occupied by extra-literary verbal phenomena. The verbal
function or orientation seeks form, and finds it in the romance, the joke, the
play on rhyme, bouts rimés, charades, etc. And here the aspect of genesis, of the
presence of certain kinds of extra-literary speech forms, acquires its evolutionary
significance.78
The second part of Bakhtin’s Dostoevskii book may already bear the
traces of his positive engagement with later Formalism, and his
‘Discourse in the Novel’, written in exile –— and therefore unhindered
— in the early 1930s, is strikingly consistent with Tynianov’s formula-
tions in its approach to genre.79 By the time of ‘The Problem of Speech
Genres’ in 1952–53, however, Bakhtin’s belated attempt to develop
Voloshinov’s initial proposition that ‘social psychology is given mainly
in the most varied forms of the “utterance”, in the form of small speech
genres, inner and outer, which have until this time not been studied at
all’,80 the status of Tynianov’s later theoretical essays as precursor texts
is manifest on every page.
There is more at stake, therefore, in this association of Bakhtin and
the later Tynianov than simply casting a different light on certain local
difficulties in the critical environment of the Soviet 1920s, and more
even than the more substantial implication that both (and perhaps
many others) ultimately belong to a unified ‘school’ of Russian literary
78 Tynianov, ‘On Literary Evolution’, pp. 278, 279; pp. 73, 74.
79 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Slovo v romane’, in Voprosy literatury i estetiki. Issledovaniia raznykh let, ed.
S. Leibovich, Moscow, 1975, pp. 72–233; ‘Discourse in the Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination:
Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael
Holquist, Austin, TX, 1981 (hereafter, The Dialogic Imagination), pp. 259–422.
80 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 20; p. 232. Bakhtin does make spe-
cific use of the term, although far from programmatically, in the Dostoevskii book; it then
surfaces only once in his work between the late 1920s and the early 1950s, at the very close
of ‘From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse’: see M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Iz predystorii
romannogo slova’, in Voprosy literatury i estetiki. Issledovaniia raznykh let, ed. S. Leibovich,
Moscow, 1975, pp. 408–46 (p. 445); ‘From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse’, in The
Dialogic Imagination, pp. 41–83 (p. 83).
Also, M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Problema rechevykh zhanrov’, in Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 5, ed.
S. G. Bocharov and L. A. Gogotishvili, Moscow, 1996, pp. 159–206; ‘The Problem of
Speech Genres’, in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael
Holquist; trans. Vern W. McGee, Austin, TX, 1986, pp. 60–102.
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theory.81 Both Tynianov and Bakhtin, ostensibly from very different
critical (and pragmatic) locations, imply not only the possibility of a
fundamental renovation of literary study, but do so in a manner that is
dazzlingly integrated and responsive to the recurrent problematics of
literary theory. On one level, their conception of literary material as
indivisibly verbal and extra-verbal is the basis for a synchronic textual
study that is at one and the same time immanent and orientated
outwards to the extra-literary (but not now, properly speaking, extra-
verbal) context of its production. On another level, they imply a revo-
lution in our conception of literary genre, which is seen as a kind of
‘recorder’ of the evolutions in the literary system that are produced by
changes in the material itself, and in the ways it ‘enters’ or is ‘brought
into’ literature: the basis, that is, for a diachronic study of systemic
organization and change.
This methodology for literary study, predicated on an entirely new
conception of literary material, was not accessible from the falsely
dichotomous and hence mutually reinforcing ‘material aesthetics’ of
either Formalism or Marxism; and, given the influence of various
redactions of Formalism and Marxism on the later course of literary
theory, it is perhaps not surprising that it has remained largely inacces-
sible since. It is both ironic and appropriate that Tynianov’s later reori-
entation of Formalism, driven as it is by a perception of the need to
historicize theory, should present itself as the moment from which the
history of theory requires to be rewritten; it is even more appropriate
that this historical imperative is inextricably bound up with the impera-
tives of renewal in terms that we should hesitate in labelling ‘merely’
literary or ‘purely’ theoretical.
81 This suggestion was made explicit by Igor´ Shaitanov at a Moscow conference in 1993,
and met with what V. V. Zdol´nikov describes as ‘extremely active opposition’; see Igor´
Shaitanov, ‘Bakhtin i formalisty v prostranstve istoricheskoi poetiki’, in M. M. Bakhtin i
perspektivy gumanitarnykh nauk, ed. V. L. Makhlin, Vitebsk, 1993, pp. 16–21; Igor´ Shaitanov,
‘The Concept of the Generic Word: Bakhtin and the Russian Formalists’, in Adlam et al.
(eds), Face to Face: Bakhtin in Russia and the West, pp. 233–53; see also, V. V. Zdol´nikov,
‘Vopros ostaetsia otkrytym (Nemnogo syb´´ektivnye zametki o konferentsii “Bakhtin i
perspektivy gumanitarnykh nauk”, Moskva, RGGU, fevral´ 1993 goda)’, Dialog. Karnaval.
Khronotop, 1993, 2–3, pp. 198–200.
See also, D. Kujundzic, ‘Bakhtin i Tynianov kak interpretatory Dostoevskogo’, in D.
Kujundzic and V. L. Makhlin (eds), Bakhtinskii sbornik II: Bakhtin mezhdu Rossiei i zapadom,
Moscow, 1992, pp. 45–49, which lights upon the similarity in Bakhtin’s and Tynianov’s read-
ings of the textual status of varied discursive forms in Dostoevskii, without making explicit
the relationship between this problematic and the problem of material, from which, in our
analysis, it is inseparable.
